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Abstract 
Despite the extensive attention to the role of entrepreneurs’ business or political ties, few 
studies have distinguished the basis of those social ties. The aim of this study is to explore 
the different roles of the entrepreneurs’ personalized and formal social ties on the firms’ 
innovation performance. Based on renqing and formal rules, this study extends the social 
ties’ typology into four categories, namely, transactional business ties, transactional 
political ties, guanxi business ties, and guanxi political ties. Using data collected from 209 
Chinese firms, we further identify the distinctive contributions of the different ties on the 
entrepreneurial firm’s innovation performance under different institutional environments 
and entrepreneurs’ survival pressure. This paper will help researchers and managers better 
understand the function of social ties in innovation in emerging markets, such as China. 
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Innovation is crucial for entrepreneurial organizations to expand their R&D abilities, 
maintain their innovative advantages, and strengthen their competitive positions (Lumpkin 
& Dess, 2001; Luu & Ngo, in press). Because resource gaps that are difficult to fill 
(Brouthers, Nakos, Hadjimarcou, & Brouthers, 2009), entrepreneurs have to obtain the 
necessary financial, technical, and managerial resources through their social ties (Freel, 
2000; Gao, Shu, Jiang, Gao, & Page, 2017), which can benefit the innovation of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000). Previous research has 
shown that social ties, commonly distinguished as business and political ties, can improve 
the organizational performance in emerging markets (i.e., Boso, Story, & Cadogan, 2013; 
Luo, Huang, & Wang, 2012; Peng & Luo, 2000). 
        Despite the increasing research focus on the relationship between social ties and firm 
performance, the role of social ties on innovation performance is still underdeveloped. On 
the one hand, insufficient attention has been paid to innovation under the entrepreneurial 
situation in emerging markets. Innovation activities require entrepreneurs to overcome risks 
and uncertainties, unlike the resource requirements for the long-term performance of 
enterprises (Freel, 2005; Kreiser, Marino, Kuratko, & Weaver, 2013; Lumpkin & Dess, 
2001). Accordingly, we argue that it is critical to explore the innovational effect of social 
ties. On the other hand, regarding the classification of social ties, the existing studies just 
considered the connecting agencies or exchange objects (i.e., business ties vs. political ties) 
but did not consider the basis of social ties. We believe that it is equally important to probe 
the effects of the basis of social ties on innovation because it has been found that some 
personal business or political ties are relatively loose, open or general, which are likely to 



































































political ties deal more with privacy and specialization, with a high degree of 
personalization tendencies, which are probably formed based on the close acquaintance 
relationship of the renqing (Yu & Wu, 2012), known as guanxi in Chinese. As a result, 
differences in the source of the relationship will result in distinct costs and efficiencies in 
the utilization of social ties. Clearly, the existing classification of business or political ties 
(i.e., Dong, Li, & Tse, 2013; Sheng, Zhou, & Li, 2011; Zhou, Li, Sheng, & Shao, 2014), 
will not lead to a complete and profound understanding of social ties. Taken together, our 
theoretical framework integrates the two-dimensional classification of social ties with four 
types of ties. The aim of this study is to compare the different roles of these four types of 
ties on the entrepreneurial firms’ innovation under different outside institutional 
environments and inside pressures.  
        This paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, unlike the 
simple classification of business and political ties (i.e., Luo et al., 2012; Peng & Luo, 2000; 
Sheng et al., 2011), we refined this dominant classification by addressing the social ties’ 
renqing or the formal rule basis that has been overlooked in extant studies. We argue that, 
whether they are business or political ties, they both can be further divided based on the 
different renqing or the formal rule. This two by two matrix extends this line of inquiry in 
Chinese market transition studies (i.e., Chen & Wu, 2011; Peng & Luo, 2000; Li, Poppo, & 
Zhou, 2008; Sheng et al., 2011; Shu, Albert, Gao, & Jiang, 2012; Xin & Pearce, 1996) by 
providing the distinct explanatory effect of these four types of ties. Second, despite the 
extant literature paying more attention to the organizational performance of social ties (see 
a recent meta-analysis: Luo et al., 2012), few studies address the innovational outcome of 
social ties. Since innovation is a central driver of a firm’s entrepreneurial growth (Lumpkin 



































































consequences of social ties. Third, using evidence on how institutional contexts and the 
entrepreneurs’ cognition influence the effects of social ties on innovation performance, this 
study contributes to the extant literature about social ties by better elucidating when 
different types of ties are beneficial or detrimental to entrepreneurial firms in emerging 
economies.  
Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Entrepreneur’s social ties and typology  
From the perspective of the connecting agency, the entrepreneur’s social ties can be defined 
as the frequency of contact with various network members (e.g., Barrera, 1986; Pollack, 
Vanepps, & Hayes, 2012). Simply put, these are persons with whom the entrepreneurs meet 
on a face-to-face basis, and from whom they obtain services, advice, and moral support 
(Dubini & Aldrich, 1991). Business ties contain social exchanges with partners, suppliers, 
customers, venture capitalists, bankers, distributors, trade associations, etc. (Dong, Li, & 
Tse, 2013; Dubini & Aldrich, 1991; Peng & Luo, 2000; Sheng et al., 2011; Shu et al.,2012). 
Moreover, social exchanges with government officials in central and local governments, 
regulation agencies, tax or stock market administrative bureaus, and so on, are included in 
the political ties (Gao et al., 2017; Peng & Luo, 2000).  
  Nevertheless, according to social capital theory, although social ties can be regarded as 
a kind of special social resources (Granovetter, 1985), the costs of adopting those ties are 
different based on a different trust basis (Dakhli & Clercq, 2004; Granovetter, 1973; Welter 
& Kautonen, 2005), and relational embeddedness (Hite, 2003; Li, 2007). According to 
Parsons and Shils (1951), social relationship can be generally divided into “universalism” 



































































obligations to society, while particularism represents a value orientation toward 
institutionalized obligations of friendship (Zurcher, Meadow, & Zurcher, 1965: 540). Thus, 
we can infer that if a network member is placed in a situation in which he must choose 
between particularism and universalism, his choice will reflect the impact of the emotional 
involvement embedded in these ties. Particularism determines the supremacy of value in 
the object by virtue of its special relationship with the attribute of the act, while 
universalism is independent of the special relationship between the actor and the object in 
identity (Parsons & Shils, 1951). Yu and Wu (2012) also argue that the relationship between 
firms and the other agencies in the West is highly formalized and legalized, while this kind 
of relationship in China is highly personalized. It is obvious that the extant classification 
according to the connecting agencies (i.e., business ties vs. political ties) did not consider 
the basis of social ties. Hence, we refine business and political ties into guanxi (renqing-
based) and transactional (formal rules-based) ties. Guanxi business/political ties means a 
relatively close, private and specific renqing-based (particularism oriented) relationship in 
social exchange with business/political partners. Transactional business/political ties means 
a relatively loose, open and formal rule based (universalism oriented) relationship in social 
exchange with business/political partners. 
[Insert Fig. 1] 
  As Fig. 1 shows, in our taxonomy, the entrepreneurs’ social ties can be divided into 
four types. First, we consider guanxi vs. transactional business ties. It is widely recognized 
that guanxi is a significant business determinant influencing firm performance in China 
(Luo & Chen, 1997). Basically, people in Confucian culture prefer to care for human desire, 
and business actors who build the guanxi business ties share a close consanguinity identity, 



































































regarding entrepreneurs in Wenzhou from Zhejiang Province in China, they go out to work 
together and cooperate with each other to form trade relationships, and even set up their 
own sales agencies to market local products nationwide (Nee & Opper, 2012). Unlike 
guanxi business ties, transactional business ties tend to have equal value tendencies ruled 
by calculation and fairness, and entrepreneurs and stakeholders are more likely to achieve 
market profits through formal rules, economic cooperation, exchange and negotiations.  
Second, we consider guanxi vs. transactional political ties. Zhang and Zhang (2005) 
argue that the political strategy for entrepreneurs in China may have two different styles. 
Some entrepreneurs are just reactive to avoid being “legally harmed” by the government, 
have a relatively narrow communication circle, and just focus on money investment. Other 
entrepreneurs actively build close personal relationships with government officials to obtain 
key resources or special protection. Those actors endeavor to broaden a wider 
communication circle, pay more attention to long-term investment and act more tactfully. 
Thus, we believe that transactional or guanxi political ties are used to address different 
issues for entrepreneurs. Regarding transactional political ties, the actors care about the 
economy of interpersonal activities, and this is a kind of transaction-oriented exchange. 
Meanwhile, most activities between these actors are based on the formal rules of economic 
exchange. In contrast, guanxi political ties require longer investment in social capital 
accumulation, and their exchange demonstrates a more personal, emotionally engaged and 
intimate relationship.  
Social ties and innovation performance 
Innovation, a central driver of a firm’s entrepreneurial growth (Lumpkin & Dess, 2001), is 
concerned with generating, accepting, and implementing new ideas, processes, products, or 



































































2005; Shepherd, Douglas, & Shanley, 2000) and the “liability of size”, however, many 
entrepreneurial enterprises in emerging markets find it more difficult to raise money, recruit 
and train staff, and pay administrative fees than large organizations (Aldrich & Auster, 
1986). According to the resource-dependency theory, a lack of critical resources may drive 
entrepreneurs to seek additional resources from other market participants (Hillman, 
Withers, & Collins, 2009). Those partners can be a source of “critical” resources to 
overcome a part of the liability. Previous studies have proven that both business and 
political ties play a positive role in promoting firm performance (Sheng et al., 2011). This 
phenomenon is because business connections with distributors, customers, suppliers and 
strategic partners help firms to share marketing resources and activities, which can enable 
each firm to accomplish more together than it could achieve on its own (Chen & Huang, 
2004; Yu, Gilbert & Oviatt, 2011). Furthermore, an alliance with large and famous 
cooperators (i.e., business ties) or recognition by government (i.e., political ties) can help 
firms obtain network legitimacy (Rao, Chandy, & Prabhu, 2008). Nevertheless, we do not 
understand the innovational effect of business and political ties when considering their 
differences on this basis (i.e., guanxi and transactional ties). We argue that when predicting 
innovation performance, transactional business ties and guanxi political ties will be more 
important in this two by two matrix. The reasons are as follows. 
       First, innovation activities require more heterogeneous knowledge and collaboration, 
breaking through existing market and product limitations to exploit new territories or make 
major changes to the existing resource mix (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In that case, a 
broader transactional business relationship, rather than friendship, will be highly necessary. 
Marketing studies have suggested that firms should take a customer-oriented strategy and 



































































2005; Day, 1994; Hurley & Hult, 1998). This high level of resource dependency pushes 
entrepreneurial firms construct wilder business network to achieve innovative growth.  On 
the other side, the important function of transactional political ties is to provide technology 
licenses or legal endorsements for entrepreneurial firms, which are more homogeneous than 
business ties for innovation performance. Thus, we infer that transactional business ties 
have a stronger predicting power on innovation performance than transactional political ties. 
Second, compared to the guanxi business ties, we believe guanxi political ties have a 
stronger effect on the innovational performance. In many cases, the government needs to 
balance the uncertainty of innovation and the foreseeable short-term benefits, since 
innovation activities mean risks, uncertainties and unclear returns. The government is more 
willing to favor innovation policies for state-owned enterprises with a rich resource base, 
and less supportive for small and medium-sized enterprises in the entrepreneurial period. 
As a result, it is difficult for private entrepreneurial firms with a low risk tolerance and a 
resource shortage to obtain innovational resource support through transactional government 
ties. In contrast, guanxi political ties may create opportunities for entrepreneurs and their 
firms to obtain more trustable and valuable resources. For instance, the Chinese 
government requires a firm to obtain a new Industrial Manufacturing Permit each time it 
introduces a new product, which will add extra time and resource costs. When 
entrepreneurs engage in technological innovation, the time investment in cultivating 
political ties with government officials will facilitate their negotiation (Peng & Luo, 2000). 
Furthermore, the guanxi political ties may also reduce the uncertainty caused by arbitrary 
government intervention in innovation (Zhang, Tan, & Wong, 2015). Mutual help and 
resource pooling within business networks can evolve as effective survival strategies 



































































relative, friend, fellow villager, etc., with whom it is difficult to provide enough support to 
break through the limitation of homogenous information. Therefore, we propose the 
following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Transactional business ties have a stronger positive effect on innovation 
performance than transactional political ties. 
Hypothesis 1b: Guanxi political ties have a stronger positive effect on innovation 
performance than guanxi business ties. 
 
The moderating effect of the institutional environment  
According to institutional theory (North, 1990, 2005), the allocation of resources for the 
exploitation of business opportunities cannot be considered in isolation from the broader 
institutional context in which such an opportunity for exploitation occurs (Autio & Acs, 
2010; Clercq, Lim, & Chang, 2013). Previous studies have proved that institution can be 
the complementation or substitution of market mechanisms (e.g., Peng, 2003; Sheng et al., 
2011). Compared with the transactional ties, we argue that the external environment 
incompletion and uncertainty may more significantly affect the function of guanxi ties to 
innovation performance. In a relatively well-regulated market, entrepreneurs and 
stakeholders can corporate through a formal system or contract, which can help 
entrepreneurs save the cost of exploring and maintaining the social ties. In contrast, when 
the environment lacks an institutional guarantee, entrepreneurs are more likely to rely on 
the informal system to seek legitimacy and asylum for firm operation, which requires more 



































































        Here, we choose industrial enforcement inefficiency to reflect the institutional 
environment. As Ho (2001) and Sheng et al. (2011) note, enforcement inefficiency refers to 
the extent to which the enforcement of legislation and regulations is problematic, as 
reflected by unlawful or unethical corporate behaviors. Briefly, we believe that, although 
both types of ties have positive impacts on the innovation of entrepreneurial firms, 
transactional ties play a stronger role in innovation in a low enforcement inefficiency 
environment, while informal guanxi ties plays a stronger role in a high enforcement 
inefficiency environment. 
      First, compared with transactional ties, when in an undeveloped institutional 
environment, an exchange conducted by guanxi ties can reduce innovation cost. While in a 
market lack of regulation, given the absence of established business practices, norms, and 
reliable legal recourse through litigation (Nee & Opper, 2012), the innovation cost caused 
by conflicts between economic actors over contracts is frequent. By engaging in an 
informal marketing alliance and political connection, entrepreneurs and their firms have the 
potential to overcome institutional imperfection (Shou, Chen, Zhu, & Yang, 2014) and 
develop effective opportunity identification and resource collaboration activities. 
Innovation activities require strong learning and knowledge exchange to facilitate the 
creation and use of heterogeneous information (Rodan & Galunic, 2004; Suzuki & 
Kodama, 2004). When neither formal laws nor exchange rules are effectively secure 
economic transactions between private actors, it is through a gradual and silent learning 
process that mutually beneficial business norms develop. In addition, friends, former 
classmates, coworkers, and relatives often serve as role models and provide similar trial-
and-error processes, which help entrepreneurs to pursue innovation opportunities, improve 



































































positive relations between guanxi ties and innovation will be strengthened under an 
inefficacy enforcement environment. 
In addition, building from the resource-based view, entrepreneurs of private enterprises 
are challenged to seek out novel and creative combinations of resources as a foundation for 
stimulating the efforts to innovate (Carnes & Ireland, 2013; Carney, 2005; Carrasco-
Hernandez & Jimenez-Jimenez, 2012), and they will turn to guanxi ties to acquire a sound 
investment or potentially unique technologies. However, with the gradual liberalization of 
the market and the enforcement of legislation and regulations improvement, the guanxi-
oriented development strategy will lead to the lock-in effect and hinder the creation of 
innovation-oriented practices (Zhang & Zhong, 2016), meaning that the positive 
relationship between guanxi ties and innovation will be weakened in a relatively developed 
institutional environment. In this case, the effect of transactional ties on innovation 
performance will be strengthened because the needs of the innovation-oriented practices 
can be safeguarded when enforcement efficiency improves. Enterprises can make use of the 
possibility of technology introduction, transfer at a lower transaction cost, and obtain 
stronger legal intellectual property protection. Accordingly, the efficiency of transactional 
economic exchange will be improved, and therefore it will be unnecessary to over-rely on 
the means of guanxi ties to guarantee innovation. Therefore, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 
 Hypothesis 2: Industrial enforcement inefficiency positively moderates the relationship 
between (a) guanxi ties and innovation performance and (b) transactional ties and 



































































performance than transactional ties when the enforcement inefficiency is relatively high 
rather than low.  
 
The moderating role of survival pressure 
It is often observed that organizations in certain environments respond to experience by 
making decisions conditional upon their history (Cyert & March,1963; Levitt & March, 
1988), and the firm strategy that is formed is compared with the actual performance and an 
expected performance level that the decision maker would view as reasonable (March & 
Simon, 1958; Wanous, Poland, Premack, & Davis, 1992). The high aspiration of the 
development creates a met-expectation problem, which causes pressure to search for 
solutions (Cyert & March, 1963). For entrepreneurial firms, the most important thing 
generated from the entrepreneurs’ expectations is to sustain the survival of their enterprises. 
When entrepreneurs hold higher expectations beyond their capabilities of firm growth, 
which means, under a higher level of survival pressure, the possible unmet expectation 
problem will drive them to take a more active strategy in acquiring entrepreneurial 
resources and applying more operational relationships to overcome obstacles or the liability 
of newness (Politis, 2005). Therefore, it can be expected that entrepreneurs under higher 
survival pressure will, through adopting a more active social network strategy, build the 
necessary relationships to overcome innovational obstacles. However, we propose that this 
adjustment of social ties for innovation under survival pressure mainly influences the 
network agent, which means that the effect of business ties or political ties on constructing 




































































        First, when under a higher level of survival pressure, firms and their entrepreneurs 
must solve the problem of product marketing, service improvement, resource utilization 
and technology import and seek entrepreneurial opportunities to dispense with the survival 
difficulties. In other words, obtaining basic market advantages is more important for those 
firms than seeking political rents. Since most entrepreneurial firms are at a disadvantage 
when seeking to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities with limited resources by themselves, 
or by partnering with suppliers, distributors or a peer company, even competitors can, for 
example, provide the entrepreneurial firms with product information (Heide & John, 1992), 
pertinent events in the market (Lusch & Brown, 1996), and technology acquisition 
information (Rindfleisch & Moorman, 2001). Hence, cooperation formed by business ties 
helps to facilitate the necessary learning, knowledge exchange and opportunity 
identification of innovation activities and alleviates resource constraints when 
entrepreneurial firms struggle to survive (Baum et al., 2000) and overcome some size-
related liabilities of the newness that they face. In this stage, political ties are not as 
powerful as business ties because their important function is to provide institutional 
compensation, status consolidation and legitimacy support, rather than exploit market 
opportunities and provide access to market resources. 
Second, when survival pressure is lower, the problems faced by the firm change to how 
to grow longer and be more competitive. In this stage, diversified cooperative networks can 
reduce the cost of innovation, provide nonredundant resources and help entrepreneurial 
firms acquire tacit knowledge in innovation activities (Baum et al., 2000). At this point, the 
achievement of innovation performance is not only dependent on business cooperation but 
also on consolidating their own advantages and legitimacy endorsement in the field of 



































































increased the probability of IPO approval and the market premium of entrepreneurial firms, 
which alleviates the financing constraint of innovation that requires a large amount of 
resource investment in the growth stage of enterprises. Additionally, entrepreneurs and 
firms will seek a more powerful government asylum for sustainable growth in this stage. 
For instance, when in an early stage for entrepreneurship, Tencent’s CEO Huateng Pony 
Ma and his partners did not receive any help from the government in their struggle for years 
before the company went public. Thus, Tencent was not bothered by the organizational 
inertia and government wills that would stymie breakthrough innovation. When Tencent 
grew away from the pressure to survive, Ma became a representative of the National 
People’s Congress and began to build positive political relationships to expand his territory. 
Therefore, innovation benefits from political ties need to have a stronger resource 
investment base, which is difficult to maintain in the short-term for firms with high survival 
pressure. Entrepreneurs faced with higher level pressure must turn to seek broader 
cooperation with business partners to create the opportunity to make incremental or radical 
innovations. Once the survival dilemma is solved and the abundant resource base is 
accumulated, they can adversely influence the government’s choice. Hence, we further 
hypothesize the following:  
  
Hypothesis 3: Survival pressure moderates the relationship between (a) business ties and 
innovation performance and (b) political ties and innovation performance, such that 
business ties have more positive effects than political ties on innovation performance when 




































































The joint moderating effect of enforcement inefficiency and survival pressure  
Whereas the enforcement inefficiency emphasizes the external institutional influence on the 
use of social ties, the survival pressure highlights the internal cognition effect on the ties’ 
utilization, so a joint moderating effect should be analyzed here. On the one hand, the 
reaction to the external institutional environment comes from the firm’s own foundation 
and development perception. When the entrepreneur is at a cognitive disadvantage for the 
firm’s survival and sustenance, this situation would enlarge the impact on the adverse 
effects of the environment, and then the entrepreneur would actively build informal guanxi 
ties, and even pursue rent-seeking behavior (Antony, Klarl, & Lehmann, 2017). In addition, 
under the mixed development context, the business and political ties’ function will change. 
For instance, although political ties are very important to the firms that are facing lower 
pressure, when they act in a more legal operating context, the ties’ influence may weaken 
because the need for political protection would be reduced in a mature market. Therefore, 
we can infer that under certain circumstances, combined with external dysfunctional 
competition and an internal pressure environment, the above influence of social ties on firm 
innovation will strengthen or weaken. 
        We consider at a higher level of enforcement inefficiency, how a high-pressure versus 
low-pressure firm uses different ties to achieve innovation. High pressure will motivate 
entrepreneurs to take on exploratory innovation, which requires new technological and 
market knowledge to break through the dilemma; it bears an inherently high uncertainty 
(March, 1991; Volberda & Lewin, 2003). Such uncertainty combines underdeveloped 
market institutions, which makes acquiring technology support, new knowledge and skills 
through conventional means more difficult (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000), 



































































Zhang，2007). Therefore, we can expect that, under the dual effects of high survival 
pressure and enforcement inefficiency, the positive effect of guanxi ties on innovation 
performance will be further enhanced. If we further consider the relationship type, it is 
obvious that, compared with the guanxi political ties’ function to gain a long-term resource 
facilitating innovation investment, entrepreneurs should think more about how to match the 
opportunity development and resource bricolage through business connections when the 
survival pressure is high (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Baker, 2007). Business partners or 
agencies, especially, can actually provide informational, technological or marketing 
support. Meanwhile, the allocative efficiency of political ties is often lower and slower than 
that of business ties. Thus, we can assume that, at a high level of enforcement inefficiency, 
guanxi ties, especially the guanxi business ties, will have a more positive influence on 
innovation performance for high-pressure firms.  
 
Hypothesis 4a: At high levels of enforcement inefficiency, the positive relationship 
between guanxi ties and innovation performance will be strengthened for firms under 
higher survival pressure compared to firms under lower survival pressure. Moreover, 
guanxi business ties have more positive effects than guanxi political ties on innovation 
performance when the survival pressure is relatively high rather than low. 
 
However, for lower-pressure firms, although guanxi ties can also be useful in 
overcoming the enforcement inefficiency problem, when firms do not have the greater 
pressure to survive, entrepreneurs will moderately reduce their environmental 



































































development ability, the perception of the disadvantages of the external environment will 
be weakened for entrepreneurs, and their response to the uncertainty of the innovation will 
be muted. In this situation, entrepreneurs will pursue more exploitative innovation 
according to their inertia, instead of making major changes to seek a breakthrough. To 
improve work efficiency and productivity to a greater extent, entrepreneurs and firms will 
endeavor to sell more by building more transaction ties but not just confined to close 
relationships. At this point, the positive effects of guanxi ties on innovation activities will 
be diminished, and in contrast, the positive role of transactional ties linkages will be further 
enhanced. In addition, as we argued in Hypothesis 3 above, entrepreneurial firms will build 
more political ties to form innovation activates under lower survival pressure. High 
enforcement inefficiency will strengthen this positive effect with lower pressure firms, and 
to some extent, political ties will act as an alternative to the absence of the institution 
(Sheng et al., 2011). Hence, we hypothesize the following:  
 
Hypothesis 4b: At high levels of enforcement inefficiency, the positive relationship 
between transactional ties and innovation performance will be strengthened for firms under 
lower survival pressure compared to firms under higher survival pressure. Moreover, 
transactional political ties have more positive effects than transactional business ties on 
innovation performance when the survival pressure is relatively low rather than high. 
 
Methodology 
Sample and data collection 
We surveyed the entrepreneurs or core entrepreneurial team members in China’s private 



































































were sent to areas including Guangzhou, Shanghai, Hangzhou cities and other cities in the 
Ningxia and Liaoning provinces in China. These places are areas where China’s private 
economy is developing. To increase participation: (1) we carried out the survey together 
with the Liaoning Industry and Commerce Federation and the Guangdong Chamber of 
Commerce during March 2014 to April 2015. In return, we provided these businesses with 
reports on the development of the private sector in the region; (2) we also offered to 
provide respondents participating in the survey with a summary of the research findings. As 
key informants, these entrepreneurs are assumed to be able to provide valid and reliable 
information about their businesses in ways that allow us to assemble these data in a cost-
effective manner (Du, Kim &Aldrich, 2016). 
        To enhance survey reliability and validity, we distributed questionnaires through two 
steps: first, in March 2014, we sent the questionnaires including the variables of social ties, 
industrial environment, survival pressure and control variables. Three months later, we 
collected innovation performance data to commit the longitudinal study requirements. 
Second, we used the back-translation method to reduce the bias of language and cultural 
differences (Brislin, 1980). Specifically, we translated the English version of the scales into 
Chinese, then two experts in our research field conducted the back-translation (Du et al., 
2016). Third, questionnaires were mainly collected through two stages: in the early test 
stage, we inducted an on-the-spot investigation from EMBA entrepreneurs with a 
typewritten version. We explained the survey purpose and research concept to them and 
invited them to provide feedback; then, two researchers evaluated these questionnaires at 
the same time, in order to guarantee the recovery rate and accuracy. In the second stage, E-



































































        Five hundred questionnaires were sent out and 326 were returned, representing a 
65.2% response rate. A total of 209 available questionnaires were employed in our data 
analysis. The rest of the questionnaires were excluded, because: first, there was a large 
amount of missing data for key indicators in these questionnaires, which could affect the 
validity of the data analysis; second, the questionnaires were not completed seriously by 
respondents; for example, all test items were marked with the same score; third, we selected 
the firms with private ownership to match our theoretical analysis. We tested for a 
nonresponse bias in terms of firm age, size, patent and industry between the early and late 
respondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1977; Mihalache, Jansen, Bosch & Volberda, 2012). 
We found no significant differences (p < .05) between the early and late respondents. The 
analyses indicate that nonresponse bias is not a likely issue in our study.  
        Regarding the characteristics of the responding firms, 72.7% had been established and 
operational for less than 8 years, which could be defined as new ventures according to the 
former study (Zahra, Hayton，& Salvato, 2004). The total assets for each company ranged 
from 100,000 RMB to over 20,000,000,000 RMB, and fixed assets for each firm ranged 
from 50,000 RMB to 4,00,000,000 RMB. Most of the firms are middle-sized, with the 
employee number ranging from 4 to more than 20,000. A total of 45.7% of firms came from 
the manufacturing industry, and 54.3% were in the service industry. A total of 72.8% of the 
firms in our study were defined as high-tech companies, and 27.2% were from a traditional 




































































Variables and measures  
Innovation performance. Innovation performance generally refers to the evaluation of 
efficiency and effectiveness on a firm’s innovation activity. Former studies about 
measuring innovation performance can be divided into two methods: (1) one method 
measures the innovation performance based on a firm’s R&D performance (Baumann & 
Kritikos, 2016; Bronzin & Piselli, 2016). This method emphasizes the standard technical 
achievements, which mainly relate to technology innovation activities, including the patent 
authorization number, technical market turnover, the publication number of the academic 
paper, the number of new products, and the number of products with major improvements, 
etc. (i.e., Henderson & Clark, 1990; Romijn & Albaladejo, 2002; Sørensen & Stuart, 2000); 
(2) Another method measures innovation performance based on a firm’s financial 
performance, which can reflect the improvement of the financial performance triggered by 
innovation activities (e.g., Aas & Pedersen, 2011; Dunk, 2011; Kostopoulos, Papalexandris, 
Papachroni, & Ioannou, 2011). Both methods are focused on innovation results without 
enough consideration of the innovation process.  
         To have a full reflection of the innovation activity referenced in this study, we adopted 
the research by He and Wong (2004) on exploration and exploitation innovation in order to 
evaluate a firm’s innovation performance through measuring both innovation process and 
innovation performance. These items were designed to measure a firm’s innovation 
performance from different views (e.g., development of new product and market, 
improvement on existing product, and reduction of producing cost). Respondents were 
asked to evaluate their firm’s innovation performance in the past three years on a 5-point 
scale, with 1 meaning ‘to no extent’ and 5 meaning ‘to a great extent’ by the following 



































































Open up new markets; (4) Improve the existing product quality; (5) Improve production 
flexibility; and (6) Reduce production cost and material consumption. The original scale 
designed by He and Wong (2004) contains 8 items. However, we have combined ‘Reduce 
production cost’ and ‘Improve yield or reduce material consumption’ into one item due to 
the semantic similarity of the concepts, and the same was done for the items ‘Introduce new 
generation of products’ and ‘Extend product range’. The 6 items we applied were loaded on 
2 factors in the exploratory factor analysis. The first three items express a more exploitative 
innovation strategy, and the others reflect an explorative innovation strategy. The 
coefficient α value of the scale is 0.789, which shows well the internal consistency 
reliability, and the final score of innovation performance was obtained by the mean value of 
two types of scores. 
     Entrepreneurs’ social ties. Social ties can be measured with two aspects: First, from the 
perspective of the relationship object, a business tie is measured by the relationship 
between entrepreneurs and suppliers, consumers and competitors in the market, according 
to the research by Dubini and Aldrich (1991) and Peng and Luo (2000). A political tie 
mainly includes the social relationships between entrepreneurs and government officials at 
the tax bureau, industrial and commercial bureau, etc., used by Li and Zhang (2007), Peng 
and Luo (2000) and Xin and Pearce (1996).   
        Second, from the perspective of the personalization attributes of the relationship, 
guanxi ties with renqing attributes are based on human relations, which are mainly acquired 
from friends, relatives or former colleagues, basically dealing with contracts by the face 
and private connections, while transactional ties with market-based relationships are based 
on regular market economic exchange without considering the factors of favor and face. 



































































differentiate the effect of guanxi and the transactional ties used in Chinese firms, we focus 
on the differences in relationship sources and the emotional linkage of various types of ties 
without making a detailed distinction of the specific objects under business or political ties, 
considering that previous studies have conducted extensive research on them.  
        Finally, from the perspective of relationship strength, this paper reflects the degree and 
closeness of such ties through the entrepreneurs’ mastery of them. Likert’s five-point scale 
is adopted, then the average processing is carried out to obtain the score of these social ties. 
The items are as follows (1-5 means very little to a lot): (1) Business ties: when you make 
business connections with your supplier, customer, competitor, technological and market 
partner, how much of them are: 1) achieved through private personal relations and informal 
reciprocal rules, such as family members, relatives, close friends, hometown connections, 
schoolmates and so on (marked as guanxi business ties); 2) achieved through a transaction-
oriented economic exchange relationship, such as recognizing the right people for a deal 
(marked as transactional business ties). (2) Political ties: when you make political 
connections to government agencies, such as government officials, tax bureau, state banks 
and industrial and commercial administration bureaus, how much of them are: 1) achieved 
through private personal relationships and informal reciprocal rules, such as family 
members, relatives, close friends, hometown connections, schoolmates, and so on (marked 
as guanxi political ties); 2) achieved through a transaction-oriented economic exchange 
relationship, such as recognizing the right people for a deal (marked as transactional 
political ties).   
          In addition, another reason why the one-dimensional measurement is used instead of 
the analysis of multiple specific relationship activities is that the costs (such as dry shares, 



































































firms in the construction of social ties are very private and sensitive issues in the operation 
process. Many respondents refused to answer such questions directly, especially when it 
came to political ties, which caused those specific activities to be especially difficult to 
measure according to their privacy and moral sensitivity. 
        Enforcement inefficiency. The measurement scale we applied in this study was adopted 
from research by Sheng et al. (2011), which was derived from the study of the measurement 
of the institutional environment developed by Li and Atuahene-Gima (2001). The scale 
assesses enforcement inefficiency as the extent to which unlawful behaviors, such as piracy, 
counterfeiting and unfair competitive practices, pervade the marketplace. This scale 
contains two items: (1) the industry has experienced some unlawful competitive behaviors, 
such as illegal copying of new products, counterfeiting of our firm’s own products and 
trademarks by other firms; (2) the firm has experienced increasingly unfair competitive 
behaviors from competitors in the industry. The items are anchored on a 5-point Likert 
scale. The coefficient α value of the scale is 0.736, which shows the internal consistency on 
reliability well.  
        Survival pressure. The survival expectation of the enterprise by the entrepreneur 
shows their confidence or pressure for the firm’s growth and can also affect the 
entrepreneur’s propensity for risk (for example, Kahneman, & Tversky, 1979; Schneider, 
1992). The survival pressure was measured by asking entrepreneurs about their 
expectations and an evaluation of the firms’ survival for certain years, for example, a 
minimum of 8 years for entrepreneurial firms (Biggadike, 1989; Ciavarella, Buchholtz, 
Riordan, Gatewood, & Stokes, 2004). The variable is anchored on a 5-point Likert scale 
(feel worried to feel confident). Finally, we reverse the item score to reflect the survival 



































































       Control variables. Several control variables were considered. Firms that were in 
existence longer or have a large scale may have more innovation output due to the 
advantage of knowledge accumulation (Coad, Segarra, & Teruel, 2016; Sorensen & Stuar, 
2000). Therefore, we controlled firm age, which was defined as the number of years from 
foundation until 2014, and firm size controlled, as well, by the relative assets scale (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990). The patents/copyrights situation was also examined to control the 
firm’s innovation variation. In addition, industry variation was controlled by measuring the 
industry’s competition intensity. 
Validity and the common method bias  
We examined the unidimensionality and convergent validity of the constructs by 
confirmatory factor analysis. The fit indices indicate that the models fit the data well (χ2 = 
47.32, df = 16, χ2/df < 3, RMSEA =.073, CFI =.903, TLI =.891, RMR = .060). Next, we 
calculated the average variance extracted (AVE) from our two multi-item latent variables. 
The AVEs for innovation performance (.755) and enforcement inefficiency (.475) are much 
larger than the squared values of pairwise correlations between the two latent constructs. 
The AVE of innovation performance is higher than the benchmark of .50 (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981), and enforcement inefficiency had an AVE near .50. A common method 
variance problem may result from collecting the dependent and independent variables from 
the same respondent in the same survey. We used both procedural methods and statistical 
techniques to reduce this potential bias. First, we carefully developed our questionnaires to 
avoid vague concepts and to keep questions simple and specific. These procedures likely 
reduced the respondents’ “evaluation apprehension and [made] them less likely to edit their 
responses to be more socially desirable, lenient, and acquiescent, and consistent with how 



































































Podsakoff, 2003: 888). Second, we assured the respondents that their answers were 
confidential and that there were no right or wrong answers to the questions in the survey (Li, 
Bingham, & Umphress, 2007; Zhang & Li, 2010). Third, we created a temporal separation 
by introducing a time lag between the measurement of the predictor and criterion variables 
to reduce CMV bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Fourth, the correlations among all the 
variables are all under .50, which means there is no evidence of high correlations where 
CMV typically exists (Siemsen, Roth, & Oliveira, 2010: 472). Fifth, we checked this 
potential problem with the Harman one-factor test (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). A factor 
analysis of the dependent and independent variables yielded five factors accounting for 
69.4% of the variance, and the first factor only explained 25.8% of the variance, 
minimizing the chances of serious common method bias in our findings. Since a single 
factor did not emerge and one general factor did not account for most of the variance, the 
common method variance is unlikely to be an issue in the data. All these methods ensure 
that our research is not significantly affected by the common method bias. 
Analysis and results 
We used hierarchical moderated regression analysis to test the contingency hypotheses 
(Slotegraaf, Moorman, & Inman, 2003). To mitigate the potential threat of multicollinearity 
and clarify the interaction effects, we standardized each variable used to construct the 
interaction terms (Aiken & West, 1991). An examination of the variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) associated with each regression coefficient showed a range of from 1.01 to 2.96, 
suggesting no serious problems with multicollinearity. The means, standard deviations and 
correlations of the variables used in this study are displayed in Table 1. Table 2 reported the 



































































[Insert Table 1] 
[Insert Table 2] 
As Table 2 shows, in Model 1, we only added the control variables, which explained 
8% of the variance in innovation performance, and this mainly comes from firm size and 
patents. 
In Model 2, we included the main effects of the four kinds of social ties, which 
significantly increased the explanation on variance in innovation performance (R2 = .161). 
The guanxi political ties showed a significantly positive relationship (β = .169, p < .05), 
while guanxi business ties showed no significance on innovation performance (β = .088, p 
>.1). Hypothesis 1b is supported.  Transactional political ties show a marginally significant 
positive (β = .164, p< .1) relationship with innovation performance, and transactional 
business ties showed no significance on innovation performance (β = –.044, p > .1), which 
fails to support Hypothesis 1a. A possible explanation is that for innovation activities in 
emerging markets, improving legitimacy is an important factor in innovation, and the 
business ties may have a more complex influence on innovation with a function boundary. 
In Model 3, we entered the two moderator variables, and the political ties show a 
stable and significantly positive effect on innovation performance. Then, we add two-way 
interaction terms with enforcement inefficiency in Model 4. As shown in this model, the 
interactive effect of enforcement inefficiency and guanxi business ties on innovation 
performance is significantly positive (β = –.364, p < .01) similar to the interactive effect of 
enforcement inefficiency and the guanxi political ties (β = –.236, p < .05). R2 significantly 
increases to .354 in Model 4, and the positive moderating effect is shown clearly in Fig. 2. 
Fig. 2 indicates a positive effect of guanxi ties on innovation performance at high levels of 



































































become unimportant and even hinder innovation openness. Therefore, Hypothesis 2a is 
supported. However, the effect of transactional ties on innovation show no significant 
change at higher or lower level enforcement inefficiency, which fail to support Hypothesis 
2b. Model 5 and Fig. 3 show that the interaction between survival pressure and social ties 
mainly occurs through transactional business ties (interaction β = .277, p < .01). Thus, 
Hypothesis 3a is partly supported and Hypothesis 3b is not. 
[Insert Fig. 2] 
[Insert Fig. 3] 
        Finally, in Model 6, we considered the three-way interaction term to test Hypothesis 4. 
As Lam, Chuang, Wong and Zhu (2019) suggested, we test the 3-way interaction using the 
steps above. First, the three-way interaction term should be statistically significant. We 
observe that the coefficient of the three-way interaction term is statistically significant with 
the guanxi business ties (β = .566, p < .01) and transactional political ties (β = –.267, p 
< .05). To illustrate the results more clearly, we plotted the three-way interaction results in 
Fig. 4 using the procedures developed by Aiken and West (1991) and Dawson and Richter 
(2006). Second, the simple slopes at low and high survival pressure must be significantly 
different. To test Hypothesis 4a, we compared slopes 1 and 2 in Fig. 4A to observe 
differences between high and low survival pressure and guanxi ties at high levels of 
enforcement inefficiency. We observed supportive evidence for our prediction that slope 1 
shows a positive influence and slope 2 shows a negative change; the difference in slopes is 
statistically significant (t = 1.956, p < .05), which means that in a high enforcement 
inefficiency environment, firms with high survival pressure will adopt more guanxi 
(business) ties to achieve innovation performance. Thus, Hypothesis 4a is supported. For 



































































relationship between business ties and innovation performance (slope 1 vs. slope 2 in Fig. 
4A) is observed for firms facing a higher survival pressure compared to firms with lower 
survival pressure. As for low pressure firms, transactional political ties show a slightly 
more positive effect on innovation than high pressure firms (slope 1 vs. slope 2 in Fig. 4B). 
Thus, Hypothesis 4b is supported. 
Additionally, we compared slopes 3 and 4 in Fig. 4B and slope 3 versus 4 in Fig. 4A to 
observe differences between high and low survival pressure and transactional ties at low 
levels of enforcement inefficiency. At low levels of enforcement inefficiency, a more 
positive relationship between transactional political ties and innovation performance (slope 
3 vs. slope 4 in Fig. 4B, t value for slope difference = 2.803) is observed for firms facing 
higher survival pressure compared to firms with lower survival pressure. However, for the 
guanxi ties, at low levels of enforcement inefficiency, the positive relationship between 
business ties and innovation performance for low pressure firms is changed to negative for 
firms facing higher survival pressure (slope 3 vs. slope 4 in Fig. 4A, t value for slope 
difference = –4.952). The slope change indicates that at low levels of enforcement 
inefficiency, the relationship of transactional ties and innovation performance appears to be 
positively related for firms facing higher survival pressure compared to firms with lower 
survival pressure.  
[Insert Fig. 4A and 4B] 
        For the robustness test, we (1) replace 8 years in the measurement of survival pressure 
with 5 years; (2) winsorize all the variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to avoid the 
influence of extreme observations (Flannery & Rangan, 2006); (3) change the method of 



































































All the results show no significant difference with what we received in previous models. 
Thus, our findings can be regarded as robust.  
Conclusion and discussion 
Theoretical contributions  
Management issues and the entrepreneurship environment in emerging markets such as 
China are recognized as being different from what has been studied in mature markets. By 
drawing on the social network, institutional and resource-dependence theories, this study 
examined the relationship between specific social ties and innovation performance in 
China. Our findings revealed that the effects of social ties are conditional on the 
institutional environments and survival pressure. Several important implications have been 
made to contribute our understanding in the research of social relationship and innovation. 
        First, our study enriches the research of social ties by distinguishing them from the 
duality aspect of business/political ties and transactional/guanxi ties taxonomy. Based on 
this distinction, we disclosed the contributions of different ties on the entrepreneurial firm’s 
innovation performance in various environments. Although there is a growing amount of 
literature studying the relationship between social ties and innovation or firm performance, 
our study contributes by considering the different personalization levels of those ties. We 
find that only specific kinds of social ties are directly useful for innovation activity 
(transactional political ties), and others have functional boundaries (e.g., guanxi business 
ties under high-level environment uncertainty and cognitive survival pressure), which 
means that the mixture of guanxi business ties and transactional political ties may be a 
wiser strategy in conducting business in China. Additionally, this relationship will change 



































































   Second, based on the previous research findings, our study explores new findings and 
new insights and gives a more realistic and specific reflection of Chinese private firms’ 
development. The studies share some similar findings with Sheng et al. (2011) that, for 
instance, both the business and political ties’ effects on firm performance will be 
strengthened when facing enforcement inefficiency. We found this observation to also be 
true for firm innovation performance. However, the studies differ in many aspects with 
previous research.  
      As previous studies have demonstrated the important role of business ties for the firm 
performance (e.g., Kotabe, Jiang, & Murray, 2011; Sheng et al. 2011; Shu et al. 2012; 
Zhou, Gao & Zhao, 2017) of other nonprivate firms, such as MNCs or SOEs, our findings 
support a different strategy of using ties of private firms on innovation performance. 
Kotabe et al. (2011) pointed out that high levels of managerial ties can increase knowledge 
acquisition to promote new product performance for MNC firms. However, above all, we 
find that transactional political ties have a stronger and more stable positive effect than 
business ties on innovation performance in those firms directly. This finding suggests that 
the innovation activities of private firms need more protection of their core technology, 
knowledge intellectual property and government involvement, rather than obtaining new 
knowledge just rely on business partners. This finding means that, compared with other 
types of firms, for private startups, legitimacy and institutional support from government 
endorsement remain key elements for their innovative growth.  
    Next, only guanxi ties show more important effects under an incomplete industrial 
environment. When the environment improves, those ties will carry significant costs that 
will be counterproductive. In other words, firms with highly personified political or 



































































thus, forming an obstacle to innovation. Most previous research considered only the 
political ties which can lead to “private official-manager collusion” when the market is 
developed (Li, 2005). In fact, business guanxi ties can also generate opportunism in such 
environment, which is also worth the attention of entrepreneurs. 
        Third, the joint moderating effect of enforcement inefficiency and survival pressure 
suggests that entrepreneurs in the marketplace can be active opportunists with proactive 
choice tactics rather than a purely passive institution accepter. Most previous studies 
believe that companies can only have passive adaption in the institutional environment, 
which is normally considered an external variable in relevant research. In other words, most 
of the time, firms can only bear the effect of the institutional environment on themselves. 
However, our study points out that the entrepreneurs’ subjective cognition can initiatively 
interact with the effect of the institutional environment through the adaption of different 
strategies. The analysis results show that, when the entrepreneur is under a high-level of 
survival pressure, industrial enforcement inefficiency has a stronger moderating effect on 
the relationship between the guanxi business ties and innovation performance; however, for 
low pressure firms, the influence of the guanxi ties is weakened and the transactional ties 
becomes important to innovation. Meanwhile, when the institution agencies can efficiently 
enforce exchanges, transactional ties start replacing the guanxi ties above to act on 
innovation performance, especially for high pressure firms. These results show that the 
entrepreneurs’ subjective cognition drive them to accelerate the process of 
depersonalization of social ties utilization as the industrial institution environment 
improves. Therefore, even under the same institutional environment, entrepreneurs with 
different subjective cognition might trigger different interaction results between social 



































































attention should be paid to the apply the behavioral theory of firm to innovation and 
entrepreneurship research on private firms in emerging markets. 
Practical implications 
Our study hints at larger implications for conducting business and making innovations in an 
emerging market such as China. First, marketers must distinguish the differences between 
guanxi and transactional ties and understand their distinct roles. Especially in innovative 
firms, entrepreneurs should pay attention to the management of relationships with different 
agencies. However, at the same time, firms must be cautious about the application of the 
guanxi business ties and transactional political ties when they are launched in a different 
institution environment. Second, entrepreneurs need to adjust their application of ties to 
reflect industrial uncertainty and adjust their expectation. Finally, entrepreneurs and firm 
managers should establish positive beliefs to overcome the adverse effects of the external 
environment. Although the external environment cannot be changed by the individual, the 
cognition of such an environment can the affect selection and adoption of the firm’s social 
network strategy, which further influence the firm’s innovation performance, resulting from 
the different applications of relationships. 
Limitations and future directions 
Despite its strengths, this study has several limitations that should be noted for future 
research. First, the measurement of the social ties still needs to be elaborate and designed to 
better grasp the characteristics of social networks, especially for the renqing-based ties. 
Deeper field study may be helpful for further research.  
          Second, the study chooses enforcement inefficiency as one representative of the 



































































environment in different regions of China. Thus, more factors beyond enforcement should 
be considered in further research, for instance, regional market development, and so on.  
          Third, our study reveals that entrepreneurs need to effectively choose a favorable 
type of relationship and approach to network construction in order to meet the changes in 
the external industry environment, and entrepreneurs need to recognize the risks that may 
arise from the embedding of different relationships and establish a reasonable prevention 
mechanism. In addition to considering the dynamic changes in the industry environment, 
we can further analyze the relationship between different stages of entrepreneurship and the 
network evolution path, which will help researchers to better evaluate the effectiveness of 
the entrepreneur relationship from the internal and external aspects.  
          Fourth, we focused on a single transition economy, and future research can include 
more countries representing both developing and developed nations to improve 
generalizability across different populations.  
Finally, we chose private firms as our subject, according to our research design. 
However, state-owned firms may have stronger political ties and government support for 
pursuing innovation strategies. Future research could more closely examine the firm-level 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 Innovation performance (.755)           
guanxi business ties .171* —          
guanxi political ties .174* .049 —         
Transactional business ties .004 –.021 .370** —        
Transactional political ties .260** .486** .088 –.055 —       
Enforcement inefficiency –.110 .394** .005 .060 .256** (.475)      
Survival pressure –.322** 0.114 .077 –.028 .111 .063 —     
Firm age .151 .097 .026 –.055 .230** .074 –.029 —    
Firm size .192* –.147* –.049 –.150** .140* –.161* –.369** .261** —   
Patent .212* .036 .086 .062 –.017 –.019 –.088 .114 –.018 —  
 Industry –.084 –.053 .130 .001 –.039 .174* .213** –.028 –.225* –.026 — 
Mean 3.15 3.25 3.05 3.39 2.96 3.28 1.96 2.63 2.76 3.23 2.6 
SD .73 1.20 1.05 1.01 1.11 1.04 0.73 1.27 1.01 1.24 1.22 




































































Table 2 Standardized regression results  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Controls       
















































Direct Effects       
























































2-way Moderating Effects       
































Enforcement inefficiency × Survival pressure     –.142 
(–1.262) 
3-way Moderating Effects       
Enforcement inefficiency× guanxi business ties× Survival pressure    .566** 
(3.363) 
Enforcement inefficiency× guanxi political ties× Survival pressure    .019 
(.139) 
Enforcement inefficiency× transactional business ties× Survival 
pressure 
   .258 
(1.461) 
Enforcement inefficiency× transactional political ties× Survival 
pressure 
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